This paper addresses the impact of developments in the credit risk transfer market on the viability of a group of systemically important financial institutions. We propose a bank default risk model, in the vein of the classic Merton-type, which utilizes a multi-equation framework to model forward-looking measures of market and credit risk using the credit default swap (CDS) index market as a measure of the global credit environment. In the first step, we establish the existence of significant detrimental volatility spillovers from the CDS market to the banks' equity prices, suggesting a credit shock propagation channel which results in serious deterioration of the valuation of banks' assets. In the second step, we show that substantial capital injections are required to restore the stability of the banking system to an acceptable level after shocks to the CDX and iTraxx indices. Our empirical evidence thus informs the relevant regulatory authorities on the magnitude of banking systemic risk jointly posed by CDS markets.
Introduction
In 2007-2008 the global financial system has undergone a period of unprecedented instability. The difference, however, between past financial crises and that which appears to have begun in earnest in August 2007 is the presence of the credit derivatives (CDs) market. The transmission of credit risk via these types of instruments appears, according to international financial regulators, to have amplified the global financial crisis by offering a direct and unobstructed mechanism for channelling defaults among a variety of types of financial institutions. Whilst the causes of this crisis are fairly well recognized, the mechanism of transmission of shocks between CDs markets and the banking sector is not so well understood from an empirical perspective. In fact, the academic and practitioner literature
have not yet reached firm conclusions on the financial stability implications of credit default swaps (CDSs) instruments.
The turbulences experienced during the crisis on OTC derivatives markets have prompted regulators to find solutions to enhance the smooth functioning of these markets. It is crystal clear that in a context of inadequate underwriting practices in the US subprime mortgage markets and excessive granting of loans by non regulated entities, financial innovation based on CDs was at the heart of the financial crisis.
The objective of this paper is to shed some light on the mechanisms involved in banking stability by studying the credit default swap (CDS) index market during the [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] period and exploring how negative shocks affected financial institutions as the subprime crisis of 2007 unfolded and then evolved into the global financial crisis of 2008. To explore this issue, we address empirically the relationship between CDS index markets and the viability of systemically important financial institutions.
We use a contingent claims approach, which explicitly integrates forward looking market information and recursive econometric techniques to track the evolution of default risk for a sample of 16 large complex financial institutions (LCFIs). We adopt the classic distance to default (henceforth D-to-D) to the pricing of corporate debt. The well known market based credit risk model is the Merton (1974) model, which views a firm's equity liability as a call option on asset with exercise price equals its total debt liability. By backing out asset values and volatilities from quoted stock prices and balance sheet information, the Merton (1974) model is able to generate updates of firms' default probabilities. Since one of the most important determinant of CDS prices is the likelihood of the reference entity involves in a credit event, and this likelihood is tightly linked to stock market valuation as indicated in the Merton (1974) theoretical framework, it is natural to investigate empirically the link between the stock market and CDS markets.
A priori, it is not clear whether and to what extent CDS indices and LCFIs equity values are related. We are not aware of any studies analyzing this relationship either theoretically or empirically. There is a considerable volume of literature that attempts to describe the effect of CDS on asset prices. Most of this literature relates to the co-movement of the CDS market, the bond market and the equity market. However, to our knowledge, the closest precursor to our analysis is the research by Bystrom (2005 Bystrom ( , 2006 and Longstaff (2010). Bystrom (2004) finds a linkage between equity prices, equity return volatilities and CDS spreads throughout studying a set of data from the European iTraxx CDS indices and stock indexes.
Longstaff (2010) finds that during the subprime crisis of 2007, the value of asset-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (using the ABX index as proxy) had a strong prediction power for stock market returns (using the S&P 500 and the S&P 500 financial subindex as proxies). He demonstrates empirically that the ABX indices were signalling critical information of market distress by as much as three weeks ahead and he finds strong evidence supporting a contagion mechanism -from the ABS subprime market to other financial markets -driven primarily by market premia and liquidity channels instead of the correlated-information channel. Although his data is limited to the period between 2006 and 2008 and the results focus only on the subprime crisis of 2007, the study is a highly valuable contribution as it sheds light on the potential correlation between the ABX index market and other financial markets (in primis, the equity market for financial institutions).
Our paper makes three distinctive contributions. The first contribution is a new approach to modelling banking fragility that explicitly incorporates the transmission of corporate credit risk from the CDS index market. Our model thus contributes to the existing literature on credit risk models and measures of systemic risk by exploring the intuition that CD premia are univariate timely indicators of information pertinent to systemic risks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to combine the D-to-D analytical prediction of individual banking fragility with measures of CD markets instability. While applications of the D-to-D methodology have so far mostly concentrated in the option pricing literature, we show that the Merton approach can be applied to the area of CRT. Hence, we provide a readable implementable empirical application to infer default probabilities and credit risk (or other tail behavior) on individual LCFIs.
To this purpose, we utilize a multivariate ARCH model to forecast the future volatility of banks assets conditioned on the co-evolution of banks equity and the CDs market. The incorporation of uncertainty and asset volatility are important elements in risk analysis since uncertain changes in future asset values relative to promised payments on debt obligations ultimately drive default risk and credit spreads -important elements of credit risk analysis and, further, systemic risk (IMF, 2009). The econometric framework allows testing for the predictive contribution of developments in the CD market on the stability of the banking sector as depicted by the D-to-D of major financial institutions.
The paper includes a section that sets out the possible links between the value of banks equity and the CDS market. The basic idea is that as banks deliberately undertake risky projects that embed counter party risk the value and volatility of the banks assets will co-evolve with developments in CDS markets.
In the same section we outline the econometric methodology we employ for the calculation of the probability of default for the 16 institutions in our sample. We have opted for a mixture of MV-GARCH model and Monte Carlo simulations instead of a multivariate stochastic volatility model. We believe that this is a rather robust approach as it allows us to obtain the empirical distribution of volatilities, based on the dynamic structure given by the MV-GARCH model, and subsequently compute the probability of default when the actual volatility is not known but its frequency distribution can be computed. A full account of the methodology is presented in the paper.
The impact of developments in the CD market on the asset volatility is captured by the evolution of the corporate investment-grade CDS indices (CDX and the iTraxx). CDX North-American is the brand-name for the family of CDS index products of a portfolio consisting of 5-year default swaps, covering equal principal amounts of debt of each of 125 named North American investment-grade issuers. The iTraxx Europe index is composed of the most liquid 125 CDSs' referencing European investment grade and high yield corporate credit instruments.
In addition, the study makes a second methodological contribution. Having established a relationship between CDS indices and our measure of fragility for LCFIs we turn the focus of our analysis to the problem of determining an institution's potential regulatory capital requirement. To this end, we again use the VAR framework to perform a forwardlooking stress test exercise to estimate capital surcharges based on a variety of asset volatility scenarios. Essentially, we impute the required capital injections per institution, based on the distribution of the volatility of their own assets, given a-priori maximum probability of default that is set at 1%. We believe that this setting constitutes a useful predictive tool that financial regulators may wish to employ to gauge the implications for the stability of systemically important financial institutions given developments in CDs markets.
The analytical foundations of our stress test scenario exercise draw from the stress testing literature-thus allowing the model to focus on credit risk-and from the structured finance literature-thus enabling the model to consider the systemic effects of CDS shocks. By adopting a clear and thorough methodology based on severe scenarios, providing detailed bank-by-bank results and deploying, where necessary, remedial actions to strengthen the capital position of individual banks, the stress test exercise is an important contribution to strengthening the resilience and robustness of the global banking system.
In the past regulators have focused on traditional lending risks that form the basis of bank capital requirements. The stress test provides a more rounded assessment of the amount of equity a bank needs in order to be considered well capitalised relative to the risks it is running. Since the goal is to lessen the probability of tail-risk scenarios, following this approach, the regulator would be able to identify the highest default risk probability assigned to each institution over the cycle and base the capital surcharge on that asset volatility scenario.
The third contribution is an empirical test of this framework for an important category of financial institutions, the Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), which can be regarded as representative of the global banking system. The degree to which individual banking groups are large in the sense that they could be a source of systemic risk depends on the extent to which they can be a conduit for diffusing idiosyncratic and systemic shocks through a banking system. Broadly we can distinguish between two types of pure shocks to a banking system systemic and idiosyn1cratic. The focus of attention of the authorities, entrusted with the remit of financial stability, is the monitoring of the impact of shocks affecting simultaneously all the banks in the system. A common finding in the empirical literature is that the level of banks' exposure to systemic shocks tends to determine the extent and severity of a systemic crisis. However, another source of systemic risk may originate from an individual bank through either its bankruptcy or an inability to operate. The transmission channel of the idiosyncratic shock can be direct, for example if the bank was to default on its interbank liabilities, or indirect, whereby a bank's default leads to serious liquidity problems in one or more of the financial markets where it was involved.
As far we are able to determine, this is the first investigation to establish a relationship between the CDX and the iTraxx CDS indices and the banking sector which supports the consideration of a transmission mechanism in order to account for the potential of default risk of several global LCFIs. We adopt a working definition of banking instability as an episode in which there is a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock occurs in the CDS market.
In early 2009, the US Fed conducted stress tests on its banking industry and found that 10 lenders needed nearly $75bn of additional capital between them. This managed to soothe the markets and helped US banking stocks rebound. The stress tests were designed to ensure the 19 leading US banks have enough capital in general, and equity in particular, comfortably to survive a deeper-than-expected recession. They were also intended to provide more standardized information about bank asset portfolios. Recently, the European Union has also conducted stress tests on banks accounting for about 65 per cent of the EU banking sector.
This application can be useful for supervisory scenario stress testing when complemented with models of the probability of default and loss given default. Scenarios stress tests involving both US and European LCFIs could help establish the level of impairment to assets and capital needs.
Our most important findings are threefold. First, we find that systemically important financial institutions are exposed simultaneously to systematic CDs shocks. In practice, we find that the sensitivity of default risk across the banking system is highly correlated with both the CDX and the iTraxx indices markets and that this relationship is of positive sign.
Hence, direct links between financial institutions and the CDS index market matter. This is evidence of some spillover effects from the CDS market after the onset of the crisis. Second, our model allows us to quantify the required capital needs for each LCFI via the overall price-discovery process in the two CDS indices markets. The main insight from our estimates is that the US government re-capitalization programmes considerably underestimated the necessary capital injections for the US LCFIs. A plausible explanation for this result is that the specification of our model does do not reflect any explicit or implicit government guarantees on the total debt liabilities of the institutions. Third, XXXXXXXX All our results have several important implications both for the financial stability literature and for global banking regulators. The study offers an insight on the intricate interrelationships between CDS markets developments and the individual and the systemic stability dimensions of the international banking system. It helps to quantify the transmission of shocks and their volatility to a specific metric of financial stability. Our model specification can help policymakers monitor default-risk and the distance to specific capital thresholds of individual financial institutions at a daily frequency by testing the extent of co-movements between North American and European CDS market conditions in normal as well as stressful periods.
This suggests that our approach can serve as an early warning system for supervisors to pursue closer scrutiny of a bank's risk profile, thereby prompting additional regulatory capital and enhanced supervision to discourage practices that increase systemic risk. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section §(2) briefly reviews the related literature. Section §(3) outlines the theoretical foundations of our approach. Section 4 introduces the D-to-D approach and sketches in some detail our stress testing framework.
Section §(4) describes the data. The results are presented in §(5) and Section §(6) concludes.
Related Literature
The recent and growing literature on financial innovation and financial stability is characterized by a lack of consensus on the net effect of CRT on the financial system. Duffie (2008) discusses the costs and benefits of CRT instruments for the efficiency and the stability of the financial system. The argument is that if CRT leads to a more efficient use of lender capital, then the cost of credit is lowered, presumably leading to general macroeconomic benefits such as greater long-run economic growth. CRT could also raise the total amount of credit risk in the financial system to inefficient levels, and this could lead to inefficient economic activities by borrowers. Allen and Gale (2006) develop a model of banking and insurance and show that, with complete markets and contracts, inter-sectoral transfers are desirable. However, with incomplete markets and contracts, CRT can occur as the result of regulatory arbitrage and this can increase systemic risk.
Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, Allen and Carletti (2006) document that the transfer between the banking sector and the insurance sector can lead to damaging contagion of systemic risk from the insurance to the banking sector as the CRT induces insurance companies to hold the same assets as banks. If there is a crisis in the insurance sector, insurance companies will have to sell these assets, forcing down the price, which implies the possibility of contagion of systemic risk to the banking sector since banks use these assets to hedge their idiosyncratic liquidity risk. Morrison (2005) shows that a market for CDs can destroy the signalling role of bank debt and lead to an overall reduction in welfare as a result. He suggests that disclosure requirements for CDs can help offset this effect. Bystrom (2005) investigates the relationship between the European iTraxx index market and the stock market. CDS spreads have a strong tendency to widen when stock prices fall and vice versa. Stock price volatility is also found to be significantly correlated with CDS spreads and the spreads are found to increase (decrease) with increasing (decreasing) stock price volatilities. The other interesting finding in this paper is the significant positive autocorrelation present in all the studied iTraxx indices. A recent study by Hu and Black (2008) concludes that, thanks to the explosive growth in CDs, debt-holders such as banks and hedge funds have often more to gain if companies fail than if they survive. The study warns that the breakdown in the relationship between creditors and debtors, which traditionally worked together to keep solvent companies out of bankruptcy, lowers the system's ability to deal with a significant downwar shift in the availability of credit.
There is also little consensus on the relative importance of CDS and bond markets, and even less consensus on the CDS-equity markets relation. At least part of the difficulty has to do with measurement. 
Methodology
We divide our empirical analysis into three sections. In the first section § §(3.1), we develop a theoretical framework for objective levels of default risk. In the second section of our investigation, § §(3.2), we outline a generalized stochastic volatility model of bank assets with multiple volatility instruments. Finally in the third section § §(3.3), we define an econometric model using a vector autoregressive model with multivariate autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic disturbances (VAR-MV-GARCH) to determine the time evolution of the joint volatilities of the equity and our benchamrk CDS indices. We also extend this model to infer forward looking simulations of the joint evolution of the asset value process and hence determine the additional contingent capital requirements for each individual LCFI.
Objective Levels of Default Risk
Consider a policy objective setting the default risk probability, over some relative time horizon T − t, defined as p * , such that for any systemically important institution,
imposed by a regulator. The probability of default at time t, for the i th institution, will be conditioned on the imputed conditional annualized volatility,σ A,t , and value of assets, V A,t . For any given systemically important financial institution suffering from some form of financial distress, with probability of default, p i,t , the difference in probability p
under the assumption of conditional normality, will correspond to the difference between the minimum D-to-D set by the regulators and the current imputed distance
If δ i,t < 0, then we define δ i,t as the distance to distress, if δ i,t > 0, then we define δ i,t as the distance to capital adequacy. Given δ i,t > 0, the required capital injection to boost the value of assets to a point whereby η (p
, is defined as the capital shortfall.
Assuming that V E is the observed value of equity and V L is the observed value of liabilities at time t, we can treat the capital requirement problem as a typical option pricing problem.
We first take the standard assumption that V E is equivalent to a European call option on assets at time T , which we impose exogenously. Furthermore we treat the liabilities as being fixed. The value of this call option will be dependent on the properties of the underlying stochastic process driving the value of assets, with structural parameters θ A and the current value of these assets V A,t , with strike price V L,t .
The value of the call option will be proportional to the probability of default
furthermore assuming that for a given stochastic process the terminal distribution of asset values at T is given by,
for a regulator the objective is to assess whether the probability that the value of assets at T will be less than the policy objective, i.e.
this terminal distribution will depend on the choice of stochastic process driving V A,t .
A Stochastic Volatility Model of Bank Assets
We motivate our proposed relationship between the fluctuations of the banks' assets and developments in the market for CDS by considering the development of the value of the assets V A of a typical bank with assets and liabilities V L .
Liabilities are fixed and are of known value and liquidity. Assets are chosen from a portfolio V A of risky underlying assets and hedging instruments such that V A (t) = α S(t) + β H(t), where S(t) and H(t) are vectors of risky and hedging instruments, respectively. The appropriate length vectors of dynamically re-balanced weights that ensure the hedging ratio maintains a target level of volatility are denoted by α and β . We define two risk vectors.
The first vector is the chosen level of risk σ V A to which a bank exposes itself in order to generate potential excess return. The second risk vector is the level of completeness of the hedging instruments. We consider this risk vector to be driven by k − 1 risk instruments
. . , x k−1 } which can be regarded as representing counterparty risk embedded into the hedging contracts used to control the banks exposure to risky assets and may or may not be observed. Combining the assets and the instruments in the second risk vector, we define the k length vector y (t) = V A (t) , x 1 (t) , . . . , x k (t) and the multivariate stochastic differential equation that denotes its time evolution as follows
where µ is a vector/matrix function of drifts, σ is a vector/matrix function driving volatility and W (t) is a k dimensional Weiner process, i.e.
Regarding the the nature of µ(·) and σ(), we proceed following the approach suggested by Williams and Ioannidis (2010) and adopt a stochastic covariance model of the form
A (t) = ivech (log a (t)) (9)
where
The first term indicates that the evolution asset growth is based on the instantaneous risk free rate r and {µ 1 , . . . , µ k−1 } are the independent drifts of the instruments. The stochastic covariance matrix Σ A (t) consists of a 1 2 k (k + 1) vector stochastic process a(t). For simplicity, we set λ, for the covariance process to zero and the volatility of volatility function, ξ (·) , is considered time invariant a i (t) ∈ R. Williams and Ioannidis (2010) derive the optimal number of hedging instruments for a simple stochastic covariance model to be 1 2 k (k + 1)+1, given k diagonal and
off-diagonal processes driving the volatility component. The attractive feature of this model is that it enables to derive an analytic specification of a single quantity that combines all the relevant variance and covariance terms as Σ A (t) is guaranteed to be PSD. The evolution of y(t) from time t to t + h can be represented by an instantaneous multivariate Brownian motion with covariance matrix
where f is a function that aggregates the steps in the volatility equation in 7. The use of the ivech transformation ensures positive semi-definiteness (PSD) on any instantaneous realization of Σ t that allows for its factorization. Now, we denote Σ 
where K is the strike price, T is the maturity of the call, under the assumption of an equivalent time horizon T − t = h. Next we assign theC to denote the individual Black and Scholes price of a call option with volatility σ s , over an experiment space with respect to s. Note that we are unable to observe the continuous time asset process. However, the specification of our model can predict values of the call option, i.e. the value of equity, that exhibit some form of stochastic covariation with the evolution of the chosen volatility instruments. Therefore, we incorporate this property into an econometric specification of equity. Consequently, the actual realisation of the volatility of equity results from the matrix squareroot of the instantaneous covariance between equity and CDS indices and not merely from the squareroot of the realisation of its variance. In practice this means simulating across the parameter space of Σ(t), to generate draws of the volatility process.
Econometric Specification
Under the framework illustrated above, we use a vector autoregression (VAR) model, y t = Zy t−1 +µ+u t , with BEKK type multivariate autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic disturbances to define the discrete time dynamics of the mean and variance systems.
Z is the 3 × 3 matrix of lagged coefficients, µ is a vector of intercepts and u t is a disturbance process with conditional covariance matrix E t u t u t = Σ t . The vector of interest is the VAR of the equity returns and log differences of the CDX and iTraxx CDS indices,
The VAR model disturbances are driven by a BEKK conditional covariance model
We impose a lag order of one on both the mean and variance covariance equations. KK is the intercept in the variance equation and A and B are the 3 × 3 ARCH and GARCH autoregression coefficients, respectively. The long run covariance matrix of the VAR system disturbances takes the following form
The structural disturbances ε t are computed from Σ 1 2
t is the matrix square root of Σ t . Note that the mean and variance models are jointly estimated with maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Setting the parameter vector θ as θ = [vecZ , µ , vechK , vecA , vecB ] , the MLE objective function is given by
where the recursion of the likelihood function is
Using the estimated VAR and MV-GARCH parameters, we generate a set of Monte Carlo pathways to simulate a set of possible future asset volatilities and then stratify these into a set of future volatility scenarios.
Forward Looking Simulations
Specifically, we draw N one year (252 days) pathways of the 3 × 1 column vector ε t , i.e.
for the s ỹ t+s ,Σ t+s ε t+(s−1) , . . . ,ε t ;θ
For each pathway, we compute the annualized average volatility 2 . We use to represent the draw and evolution from one sample path. Following Hwertz (2005) who demonstrated that BEKK type processes exhibit time varying multivariate fourth moments, we conduct our simulation study across these time paths to capture this effect. We then sum over one forward looking yearΣ = 252 s=1Σ t+s ε t+(s−1) , . . . ,ε t ;θ. Using the methodology of Merton, we then compute for each pathway the value of assets, the volatility of assets, the distance to default and the average probability of default. Ṽ A ,σ A ,η,p , ?? outlines our approach to computing the Merton model for a deterministic volatility. We then weight each of these pathways by 1 N and sort them via the pathway average asset volatility. We exclude the top and bottom 2.5% of the simulated asset volatilities and stratify the rest into ten quantiles, ordered from low to high volatility levels. For each of these volatility quantiles, σ 
Data Sample
The group of LCFIs consist of eight US based institutions, three UK banks, two French banks, two Swiss and one German banks. The Bank of England Financial Stability Review 2 The variance-covariance matrices over all the paths will be centred aroundΣ The CDX and iTraxx CDS indices are broad investment-grade barometers of investment grade risk and preliminary studies suggest that these offer a reasonable benchmark of the corporate credit environment. The data used in this paper is presented in Table ? 
. The system consistent restriction allows for correlation in the structural disturbances u t , but not in the autoregressive terms, Therefore, the restricted regression is of the form y t = (I • Z) y t−1 + µ + u t , where I is a 3 × 3 identity matrix and • is the Hadamard or element by element product. Setting the evaluated log likelihood of the restricted regression to L * θ 1 versus the unrestricted regression L * θ , the standard likelihood ratio test
, for each of the block restrictions.
The variance test is slightly more complex, since the restrictions are block cross products.
Again setting y t = Zy t−1 + µ + u t , the BEKK restriction is of the form 
setting the restricted likelihood to be L * θ 2 versus the unrestricted regression L * θ . The
In total 12 parameters are restricted.
Therefore, Λ 2 ∼ χ 2 (12), under the assumption of asymptotic normality 3 .
3 To see how the covariance restriction works note that We estimate the model using a rolling window starting at t − l, t, i.e. taking t = 292 as the starting date (November 30, 2004). We now consider two models: the model estimated ex-post over the whole sample, denoted with superscript W and the rolling model denoted with the superscript R. Consequently, the rolling sample comparative log likelihoods are
The rolling Kullback-Leibler statistic is defined asκ
be the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimate of the standard deviation ofκ t , we construct the rolling sumλ t = t t=1ς
−1κ
t , for t ∈ {1, ..., T }. Diebold and Mariano (1996) derive the limit theorem for this type of comparative forecast statistic under relatively mild distributional assumptions, suggesting thatλ t ∼ N (0, 1), as T → ∞. As a robustness check, we construct a Monte Carlo simulation with random and persistent jumps. These jumps are both positive and negative in magnitude. From the simulation we generate draws ofλ t . The Kolomogorov-Smirnoff test failed to reject the null of equality for 10,000 draws versus 10,000 draws from a N (0, 1) distribution.
Estimating The Forward Looking Recapitalization Requirements
We For each set of optimal forward looking parameters, we compute the restriction tests, described in § §(4.1). The results are presented in Table 3 . Again, we can observe that for every bank in the analysis we reject the inclusion of the block exogeniety restrictions in mean and variance.
Understanding the Results: A Comparative Example of RBS and Bear Stearns
To provide a more comprehensive understanding of our methodology, we now present an illustrative example from our sample of 16 banks. Specifically, here we focus on two institutions adversely affected by the subprime mortgage crisi, namely RBS and Bear Stearns. Table ? ? outlines the performance of these institutions after the onset of the crisis. We can see that both RBS and Bear Stearns suffered severe losses, which resulted in changes in the ownership structure from the pre to post crisis periods. are no longer traded as a separate entity within the sample.
We next compute the rolling parameter estimates for each model versus the whole sample parameter estimates. We present four examples for each bank over the sample period. These are plotted in Figures 3 and 4 . We can observe the first order vector autoregressive coefficient, For each bank we then run the simulation outlined in § §(3.4). We report the results in the following format. Rows represent different tolerated risk stratifications, from one standard deviation to default, ν = 1, to four standard deviations from default, ν = 4. In the second column we also report the conditional log-normal probability of default. The columns represent the 90% mass of expected (unhedged, see §(3)) asset volatilities partitioned by 15-percentiles, ranging from the lowest (5%) to the highest (95%) expected asset volatility.
The second row reports the asset volatility associated with the relative 15-percentiles. The interior of the grid reports the extra required assets for each risk tolerance -asset volatility 15-percentiles, in billions of US Dollars. For instance, in the event that Bear Stearns was subjected to an unhedged asset and volatility of 1%, which is in the first 15-percentiles below the median expected volatility, the bank would require US$ 8.0377 billion to contain the one-year insolvency risk at below 0.5%.
By contrast, RBS for the same level of unhedged asset volatility and risk tolerance would incur in an asset shortfall of US$81.1805 billion. For comparison, we also report in Table ? ?
the raised private and public support received by each troubled LCFI. 
Results and Analysis

Analysis of Dynamic Correlations
The objective of our analysis is to forecast the volatility of assets and its conditional From a visual inspection, the banks included in this study, in principle, clearly divide into two groups: the US and UK LCFIs AND the continental European LCFIs, the difference being the height of the jump of the default probability at the peak of the crisis in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. For several US banks the CDP rises to 35%
whilst for the European block the CDP are generally not greater than 25%. In the UK for HSBC the relevant probability is just above 5% (on an annual basis) whilst, not surprisingly, whilst Barclays and RBS are subject to substantial increases to default probability. More specifically, this value for RBS far exceeds 35%, rendering the bank totally dependent on government support to ensure its survival. After the announcement of in-all-but-name nationalization of the bank, the associated probability of default reverts sharply to safe levels.
The results also show significant dissimilarities in the probability of default between the US institutions as some of them show distinct reductions, whilst for others the probability of Stress testing involves hypothesizing changes in the aggregate volatility of the banks' assets and gives a simple measure of potential risk vectors in their aggregate form. These types of measures should prevent banks from leveraging themselves to a point whereby they
are extremely vulnerable to changes in asset volatility, which would then require costly readjustments, possibly forcing a bank below some critical solvency thresholds
Analysis of D-2-D Injections (Stress Testing)
In view of the econometric evidence, we proceed by conducting a bank stress-testing exercise for a given value of the liabilities to evaluate the imputed adequate bank capital requirements to ensure the soundness of each institution. Such a strong assumption is justified in the current circumstances because their valuation is more accurate when compared to the valuation of assets. A stress test exercise involves hypothesizing changes in the aggregate volatility of the banks' assets and gives a simple measure of potential risk vectors in their aggregate form. These types of measures should prevent banks from leveraging themselves to a point whereby they are extremely vulnerable to changes in asset volatility, which would then require costly readjustments, possibly forcing a bank below some critical solvency thresholds.
Asset Volatility and Required Capital Injections
The The required capital injections estimates, computed using the D-to-D methodology, need the following qualification. The assets are assumed to be drawn from a pool that preserves the overall level of volatility and capital injections by governments are considered almost risk-less and therefore will reduce the accumulation of balance sheet risks. Whether the re-payment level on these assets is recognized as a liability is a current point of debate in policy circles, particularly in the US and the UK.
A key aspect of the study is that stress-test indicators can show moves to medium-and high-volatility states and hence can be used to assess the degree of current banking fragility and uncertainty. Such indicators may also be useful in establishing whether and when a systemic crisis is subsiding, particularly if the low-volatility state persists, and thus when the withdrawal supportive crisis measures can be safely considered.
The volatility estimates are obtained from Monte-Carlo simulations using the estimated coefficients from the multivariate GARCH model. They are sorted in deciles with the exclusion of the tails immediately above the 2.5% cut-off. A close inspection of the range of the projected asset volatility values reveals substantial differences across financial institutions. to absorb extra capital in the case of Deutsche Bank. This finding indicates that for realised asset volatility at the 'mode' these banking institutions will face a capital shortfall of $160bn.
As such, this should be viewed as indicative of the recapitalization needs by these banks to stabilize this segment of the European banking system.
Focusing next on the UK based-LFCIs, the results show a mixed pattern. Interestingly, HSBC appears to be the most resilient institution. For the first two deciles of volatility no further equity is needed to meet the policy objective, whilst at 'mode' $100bn will be required. In contrast, Royal Bank of Scotland seems to be one of the more vulnerable LCFIs as reflected in its higher capital requirements. Our calculations suggest that if asset volatility reaches the specific threshold requirement, capital injections would need to be some $200bn whilst a more demanding level of volatility -standing at a 'mode' intensity -raises the amount of capital to be injected to around $260bn. Barclays experiences a wide range within its volatility distribution suggesting no call for extra capital. However, a higher volatility scenario for the bank -asset volatility at mode value of 0.017-will push up considerably the recapitalization needs, possibly totalling $100bn.
Overall, our stress-testing results clearly highlight the dangers of significant losses, as a relatively large number of LCFIs are not adequately capitalized and individually capable of surviving reasonable stress events. The deterioration of the quality of assets signalled by conditions in the CDS index market points to comparatively substantial capital injections required to restore banks' balance sheets to health. Notably for most European banks there is a reasonably wide range of asset volatilities for which additional equity is not needed to cushion potential writedowns. In contrast, for the US banks the 'safe range' of volatilities is somewhat narrow. Not surprisingly, given the common heavy exposure of these institutions to subprime-mortgage related securities, what emerges from this exercise is that in absence of rigorous policy measures to address troubled assets, the banks included in this study (with the notable exception of HSBC) enter the 'insolvency state'. However, in some cases this distress proves to be relatively short-lived. Thus, the empirical evidence underscore that capital adequacy for systemically important financial institutions remains fractured in response to CDS index market shocks.
Remaining in a high-volatility regime for long could indicate a serious threat to the stability of the banking system. Consequently, there is clear evidence that the resilience of the banking sector is conditional upon a sustained improvement to the banks' balance sheets. As a result, there remains considerable scope for further fresh capital infusions for LCFIs.
Thus, these results are consistent with the emerging consensus that the long-term viability of institutions needs to be revaluated to assess both prospects for further write downs and potential capital needs. Without a thorough cleansing of banks' balance sheets of impaired assets, accompanied by restructuring and, where needed, recapitalization, risks remain that banks' problems will continue to exert upward pressure on systemic risk. Without making a judgment about the appropriateness of our asset volatility scenarios, it is important to note that these amounts are 'inflated' to the degree that governments have guaranteed banks against further losses of some of the bad assets on their balance sheets.
Furthermore, if we consider a more conservative regulatory approach establishing the maximum tolerated default probability below 1% almost all of the institutions included in this study will be in need of substantial additional equity injections from governments. For any given safety limit the key information provided by developments in the CRT market provide a valuable signal to the authorities about the additional capital requirements for each financial institution and more importantly about the overall fragility of the banking system.
In summary, these results do provide evidence that observing shifts in asset volatility regimes using the CDX and iTraxx indices as aggregating measures of corporate default risk can be helpful in detecting the degree to which the financial system is suffering a systemic event.
Concluding Remarks
Bank default risk is currently the predominant issue of concern to academic, financial practitioners and policymakers across the world. The recent failure of several LCFIs illustrates that the too big to fail paradigm predominant in the analysis of financial stability of large mainstream commercial and investment banks is no longer valid. We approach the issue of the stability of the banking sector by studying the potential effects of CDs on the statistical moments of the equity of LFCIs.
This paper offers a concrete illustration of the direct links between the global banking system and the CDs index market. We propose a set of models and empirical tests for predicting the current and future linkages between various CD markets and financial institutions. Specifically, we jointly model the evolution of equity returns and asset return volatility of 16 systemically important LCFIs, using a VAR-MV-GARCH model, with the evolution of the two standardized CDS indices. The conditional equity volatilities are used to impute the value and volatility of assets using a Merton type model.
The impact of developments in the CD market on asset volatility is captured by the evolution of the investment-grade CDX North-American and the iTraxx Europe indices. We estimate a multivariate GARCH model to forecast the future volatility conditioned on the co-evolution of the equity returns and the CDs market. The econometric framework allows for testing of the predictive contribution of developments in the CD market on the stability of the banking sector as depicted by the D-to-D of major financial institutions.
The evidence in the paper suggests that the presence of a market for CDs would tend to increase the propagation of shocks and not act as a dilution mechanism. We have produced strong econometric evidence of a substantial detrimental volatility pullover from the CDs market to bank equity, which affects negatively the stability of the banking system in both the USA and Europe.
In view of this evidence, we conclude that banks' equity volatility associated with significant stress in the CD market matters for systemic distress. In the presence of increasing asset volatility, financial institutions require fresh capital injections. Our calculations are based on the assumption that the value of liabilities is know. Therefore, the safety and soundness of each particular institution is a function of the market value of the assets. We view these results as encouraging, and we hope that the approach we take will be useful in future explorations. 
